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DISCUSSIONS A N D EXPOSITIONS 
F R A N Z V O N K U T S C H E R A 
C O N V E N T I O N S OF L A N G U A G E A N D I N T E N S I O N A L SEMANTICS 
(Translated by A. HURKMANS) 
The article gives a critical exposition and discussion of central notions in Lewis' book 
"Convention". It emphasizes its importance for the theory of meaning. 
In his book "Convention" (1969)—hereafter referred to as "C"—David 
Lewis put forward the first systematic analysis of conventions of language. The 
question "What is a convention of language" is already by itself of great interest 
because we find that in works on linguistics and even more so in works on the 
philosophy of language this word "convention" turns up in important places of 
the argument. Again and again we come across the claim that rules of language are 
conventional, or that the meaning of linguistic expressions is conventional. But 
what does this mean? For evidently not all stipulations in our language can be 
based on conventions in the sense of explicit agreements about our language; 
this would clearly land us in an infinite regress. If conventions of language then do 
not originate by such explicit agreements, what can they be said to be and how 
do they function? 
The analysis of this question in Lewis' book, however, leads far beyond 
this initial problem. And that is why one can say that what is presented to us in 
that book are the new and fruitful beginnings of a general theory of meaning. 
I don't consider it an exaggeration to say that this theory represents an equally 
definite improvement on the speech-act-theory (as developed by J . L . Austin and 
J . R. Searle especially), as the latter theory was an advance on the theory of 
meaning-as-use (in the sense, say, of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations), 
which for its part brought us an again decisive improvement on realistic 
semantics.1 
For the last three of the theories of meaning mentioned here, see e.g. Kutschera (71). 
It is amazing then that since " C " was published Lewis's ideas have met with 
such a small response in the literature. For this reason, I would like to show in this 
essay—in the form of a critical exposition and discussion of Lewis's ideas— 
what seems to me important in them and what I see as the value of them for the 
theory of meaning. 
The following discussion is divided into three parts: first the concept of a 
convention will be characterized generally, both intuitively and formally. Then 
conventions for individual signs will be discussed and it will be shown how their 
meaning results from the nature of the conventions in question. In the third 
part conventions for languages will be dealt with, first on the basis of a model of 
logical grammar, the presuppositions of which will then be investigated 
philosophically. 
1. Convent ions 
/. /. Intuitive characterisation 
The first task in an analysis of conventions of language is to explain in 
general terms the notion of a convention and to show which function conventions 
have, how they come about and how they are stabilised. 
Examples of conventions are: 
a) Driving in the right lane in traffic.2 
b) Saying "Good morning" as a morning greeting. 
c) Meeting each other in the pub on Friday nights to play cards. 
We can say first of all: 
1) A convention is a regularity in the behaviour of the members of a group P. 
A regularity in behaviour can consist in the fact that in situations of a 
particular kind always such and such is done, or more generally that a particular 
strategy is adhered to in which to different types of situations different action-
procedures correspond. This stipulation (1) must now be restricted further: 
2) Talk of "conventions" implies that involuntary, instinctive ways of behaviour 
are excluded. Words like "actions" and "action-procedures" in the usual sense 
always characterize a free, purposeful and intentional behaviour. Consequently, we 
will, when talking about conventions, speak of "regularities in actions" instead of 
"regularities of behaviour". 
3) Speaking of a "convention" further implies that the goal of the action-
procedure in question could be achieved in a different way: it is usual to act in 
that way and one does achieve by it the goal that was intended, but it could in 
2 The statutory norm which tells us to drive on the right can be seen as a subsequent 
codification of the convention, but we want to ignore this aspect for the moment. See 
section 1.5. 
principle be done differently. That is, any action-procedure to which one is 
committed from the nature of the case as the only possible procedure to follow, 
is not conventional. 
One frequently speaks of conventions when only conditions (1)—(3) are 
fulfilled, i.e., when something is usually done which could have been done 
differently. In this sense one could, for example, call "conventional" the fact that 
tea is drunk from shallow cups or that at dinner the fork is held in the left hand.3 
A more interesting and stricter notion of a convention is obtained, however, if we 
follow Lewis and add one further stipulation: 
4) We can say that there is a conventional action-procedure only where the 
success of the action depends for everyone on the others acting likewise. 
Going back to our earlier examples: 
a) We want to avoid collisions by driving in the right lane. This is succesful 
only if everyone else drives in the right lane too. 
b) I can greet someone with a "Good morning" only if he understands me. 
He understands me because it is quite common to greet one another in the 
morning with a "Good morning". J 
c) One comes to the card-game only if one's friends meet at a particular 
time in a particular place. 
We must ask ourselves now how these intuitive elucidations of the notion of 
a convention can be made precise. As regards this, Lewis has made a suggestion 
according to which,—falling back on a game-theoretical model, one can formulate 
stipulations (3) and (4) exactly. Since (3) implies (2) one obtains in this way a useful 
explication of the notion of 'convention'. 
1.2. Coordination problem. 
In a situation S let actions from the set {fH,. . . >fimi}, where m{ > 2, be open 
to n agents X j , where i = 1, . . . ,n and n > 2. By redefining the actions we can 
obtain that the same actions are open to all agents: let m = maxmj and f i m i + r = f i m i , 
where r = 1,. . . ,m — mr f(y) says that agent y performs action f. We define: 
fi(y) = D f Y : = X 1 A f 1 1 ( y ) V y = X 2 A f 2 1 ( y ) V . . . V y = X n A fnl(y) 
f2(y) = Df Y = X x A f i 2(y) V y = X 2 A f 2 2 ( y ) V . . . V y = X n A fn2(y) 
L(y) = Df y = X x A f l m(y) V y = X 2 A f2m(y) V . . . V y = X n A fnm(y) 
Every agent X{ in S will then have the choice from actions f x , . . . , f m . This will 
be assumed in what follows. If the X { ' s in S do the same in the sense of fj, where 
j = l , . . . , m , they can do differently in the sense of fiq., where q ^ l , . . . , ! ^ . 
They can, for example, play different parts in one and the same play: one will play 
3 This last example comes from S. Schiffer who in (72) p. 152 classifies behaviour like 
this as conventional; he accordingly considers Lewis's notion of a convention too strict. 
Polonius, another Ophelia, a third Rosencrantz; but they will all be playing 
"Hamlet". 
Let R be the set of possible results of the actions of all Xj's. One can 
describe R either as set of n-tuples <f j p . . - ,fj n>, where jj = 1, . . . ,m , so that there 
are mn results. Or one defines a function r(x) over this set of n-tuples, so that R 
is then the value-domain and different n-tuples can have the same result. Let a payoff 
function u{ be defined over R for all i . Because we are only concerned in what 
follows with the payoff values we define R as in the first suggestion.4 
For x e R w e stipulate: 
(x)i = D f the i-th member of x 
X T y ~ D f x a n d y ag ree to at most the i-th member 
x 1 y = D f x and y agree to exactly the i-th member 
x/f = D f l y ( y T x A ( y ) i = f)-
For what follows we give once again the ranges of definition of the variables 
and indices: 
i , k E { l , . . . ,n}; . . . ,m}; x ,y ,zeR; (yg,e{fu . . .,fm} 
We define: 
Dl.2-1: CE(x) = D f Aiky(y ~ x => Uj(y) < Uj(x))— x is a coordination equilibrium. 
If CE(x) obtains then every agent X t prefers the situation in which all agents 
(including Xj) act as in x, to all situations in which exactly one agent (Xj or anyone 
else) acts differently. A CE x is a relatively stable state: as long as the others act 
as they do in by x it is best for everyone to act likewise. 
Dl.2-2: A coordination problem in a wider sense presents itself if and only if the 
following conditions (1)—(3) are fulfilled. 
1) AifVx(ui(x)/f)<Ui(x)). 
I.e., no agent X i has a dominant action f which in every case, no matter what the 
others do, is best for X\. In other words, every agent is presented with a real 
game-situation in which the success of his action depends on what the others do, 
so that it is appropriate for him to conform to the actions of the others.5 
2) A xyi(CE(x) A CE(y) => uj(y) < ui(x)). 
I.e., CE's are the best solutions to all the agents. 
3) VxCE(x) . 
5 If R* is defined as in the second suggestion one obtains payoff-functions uf over R* 
through u*(r(x)) = Uj(x); conversely, one can also define u { from uj*. If a function r which 
identifies results is defined over R then it must hold that r(x) = r(y)=> u4(x) = Uj(y). 
5 If there is a dominant action f for an agent X { then Xj, being a rational agent, will do f. 
One can then leave Xj out of further consideration and restrict oneself to the other agents 
for whom no action is marked out as dominant. 
There are CE's ; that is, there are results which are the relatively best ones for all 
parties concerned. Therefore all have the same interests, at least to the extent that 
they have an interest in cooperation. A CE is in this sense a solution of a co-
ordination problem, i.e., a relatively optimum result for all. 
Dl.2-3: A coordination problem in a stricter sense presents itself if, in addition, 
condition (4) is fulfilled. 
4) A x V y ( y # x A Ai( U i (x) = Ui(y)) V Vi(u s(x) < ui(y))). 
There is no solution x of the coordination problem which is the best one for 
all agents Xj . That is, there are no combinations of actions which have primacy over 
other combinations of actions just because of the preferences of the participants. 
So either there are several solutions which are optimum for all agents concerned, 
between which they will have to decide jointly, or there is no solution at all 
which is optimum for all, so that they will have to agree on some CE as a 
compromise.6 
For n = 2, coordination problems can be represented by matrices. Agent X i 
chooses by his action the column, X 2 chooses the row. The squares then represent 
the results x, the upper right indices represent the payoff values ui(x) and the lower 
left indices the values U2(x). 





































Here we have a coordination problem in the stricter sense: there are no dominant 
actions. The CE's are (2,2) and (4,4). These CE's have for both the agents higher 
payoff values than all the other results. And there is no result which for all the 
agents is better than all the others. 
The definitions in Lewis differ from the ones given here in a few points. 
From (2), (3) and (4) follows 
5) V xy(CE(x) A CE(y) A x # y; 
6 It wouldn't be sufficient just to require that AxVyi(y # x A ut(y) > Uj(x)). Because if 
there are two CE's x and y such that for all X h where i # k, x is better than all the other 
results, while for X k there is yet another, equally good solution, x would still be marked out: 
x is still the best solution for X k and he has no grounds to prefer y to x as long as x is better than 
y for all the others. 
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that is, there are at least two CE's, which is what Lewis demands. From (5) 
follows (3). 
If one demands with Lewis further on 
6) Axik(ui(x) = uk(x)), 
that is, coincidence of interests, then (1) follows from (5) but not (2). 
That is shown by the following matrix 





































Here (1,1) and (2,2) are CE's, but (4,3) and (4,4) are not CE's and yet are 
still better than (1,1) and (2,2). However, (4,3) and (4,4) represent in any case 
coordination equilibriums in the wider sense, — for which we will write C E * , which we 
define as follows: 
CE*(x) = D f A iky(yk = x =3 us(y) < UJ(X)). 
Such CE's are relatively stable states to the extent that no agent has an interest 
in just one agent acting differently. But even if we substitute CE by C E * , (5) and 
(6) will not yield (2), as is shown in the following matrix: 





















Here (1,1) and (2,2) are CE's and hence CE*'s too. (2,£jis not a CF:*, and yet is still 
better than (1,1). 
But (5) and (6) don't yield (4) either. In this matrix 
f, h 
2 1 
h 2 1 
1 3 
h 1 3 
(1,1) and (2,2) are CE's, but (2,2) is evidently the best solution for both the 
agents. 
(4) is therefore necessary to guarantee that there is no solution which is 
unequivocally preferred by all; to guarantee, in other words, that behaviour which 
is determined purely by the matter in hand is not classified, as it is in Lewis, as 
"conventional" in the sense of the definition given below in section 1.4. 
One could of course say: if 999 agents prefer CE x to CE y and only one 
agent X i prefers y to x then x has primacy over y because in that situation it is 
rational for X i to bow to the preferences of the many others. It is indeed 
possible to allow for such factors too, but that would make the exposition more 
complicated; and it is already based on a very considerable idealization. For 
example, one could also speak of a CE if the great majority of those concerned 
prefers the great majority of the others not to act differently etc. However, for the 
purposes of a preliminary sketch, the simple conceptualizations which were 
introduced above will suffice. In any case, one will have to take into account in 
some way or other the fact that we speak of a convention only if it could equally 
well be done differently. And the agreement in our example of the 1000 agents 
demands in any case a compromise from X i, that is, an action which is not marked 
out as the best one just because of his preferences. We can also imagine cases in 
which it makes sense for 999 agents to conform to one pigheaded egoist. Other 
considerations than just the valuations of the results come in here. But we have only 
spoken of the latter thus far. 
One can also redefine fj in such a way that, as Lewis presupposes, 
CE(x) Aik((x)i = (x)k); that, in other words, CE's come about only if all do the 
"same" in an appropriate sense. For the sake of simplicity we will assume that in 
what follows. 
For a coordination problem to exist, it is not required that the participants 
act simultaneously. The problem will only be restricted if one agent already knows 
how some other agents have acted. But if he does not possess any such 
information it is quite indifferent whether he acts simultaneously or later than the 
others. 
Instead of momentary acts, the fe {f i , . . . ,fm} can also be strategies in 
situations T q (qeQ, where Q is a set of indices), strategies to perform actions 
he„hx,. . . , h p " f is then a function f(q) with the value-range „h{,. . . ,h p " . The agents 
will now ascribe a payoff to the n-tuples of strategies as results. 
We also have a coordination of strategies if the agents Xj act jointly in every 
situation T q and there exists a coordination problem in every T q . Every agent is 
then concerned with the development of a strategy fj so that <f>t, .•. . ,fj n>q = 
<fji(q),. . .,fjn(q))> represents a CE for every q. The payoff-values ui(xq) can also 
depend on the q. In that case the payoff-values of the n-tuples of strategies x will be 
determined by the payoff-values of the xq's. 
1.3. Solving coordination problems. 
If agent X i , faced with a coordination problem in the stricter sense, acts 
rationally, he will choose an action f for which the utility, that is, the expected 
payoff-value Ui(f) = £ uj(x). Wif(x), is maximum. Wif(x) is here the subjective 
x:(x)if 
probability which X i assigns to the result x if he does f himself (the probability, in 
other words, that X i will do (x)i, X 2 (x)2, etc.). 
If every agent X i acts rationally in situation S and if all he knows are the 
payoff-functions of the others and that they act rationally too and don't have any 
more information than he himself has, then X i cannot meaningfully calculate 
probability-valuations wjf. For the probability that another agent Xk does g 
depends on the value Uk(g), the latter on the value Wkg whenever X i does f; 
and that value again depends on Ui(f) etc. There will be no purely rational 
solution in any coordination problem, when we have this network of dependences. 
Such problems must therefore be solved in a different way: the participants 
will come to an explicit agreement, or they will remind themselves of past cases of 
the same kind which accidentally turned out to be succesful, or they will draw 
analogies with similar cases etc. Past successes will play a special role where arrange-
ments cannot be made. To take up an example of Lewis's: if one wants to meet 
with a friend and has arranged the time but not the place of meeting and any 
contact on this matter is ruled out, one is inclined, —in the absence of other 
criteria—, to choose the place where one last met. 
Past successes, therefore, stabilise a solution of a coordination problem in 
the stricter sense; and if all participants in the past proceeded as in one particular 
solution then one can readily assume that, in similar circumstances, they will proceed 
in the same way in the future. But if I expect that all the others will act in a 
particular way then it is rational for me to act in that way too, because that way 
I obtain the relatively best solution for myself in the form of a coordination 
equilibrium^ 
1.4. Conventions as solutions of coordination problems. 
We can now give a definition like the one in Lewis (C, 42): 
Dl.4-1: A regularity f in the actions of members of a group P who are 
agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if in all circumstances 
of S: 
a) everyone does f 
b) everyone expects everyone else to do f. 
c) there is a coordination problem in the stricter sense and if all do f the 
outcome will be a coordination equilibrium. 
In this definition we have taken into account conditions (1) to (4) of 
section 1.1. We are dealing with intentional actions, the success of which for each 
agent depends on the others acting likewise. Acting in common in the sense of f 
leads to success, but there would be other ways of achieving success too. This 
is part of the notion of a coordination problem in the stricter sense (cfr. 
condition (4)). 
Because everyone expects the other participants to do f and because doing f 
jointly will result in a CE, it is rational for each agent to do f himself. 
D 1.4-1 comprises the case in which every S-situation presents its own 
particular coordination problem in the stricter sense, particularly when several 
agents take part. We can also understand the notion of a convention in a more 
general sense, viz., in the sense of the generalization (as given in 1.2) of co-
ordination problems into strategies. Let X be an agent, S a set of (disjunct) states 
(situations), § a set of action-procedures7, and © ( ) the set of all functions that 
map subsets of <S into ©. 
We define: 
Dl.4-2: A strategy of X in respect of (5 and 9) is a function c from £)( ) such 
that c(S) indicates for all § e S for which this value is defined, the action-
procedure h from which X carries out in situation S. 
If S is the set of all situations we will only speak of a strategy in respect 
Dl.4-3: A strategy of X in respect of © and f is a strategy in respect of 
Sand{f,-,f}. 
Dl.4—4: A joint strategy of the members of a group P (or "in P") in respect 
of S and 9) is a function c such that c is a strategy for all X e P in respect of S and £). 
Dl.4-5: A joint strategy c in P is a convention in P if and only if: 
a) Every member of P expects every other member to act according to c. 
b) The joint action of the members of P solves for them a coordination 
problem in the stricter sense (i.e., the outcome is a CE). 
A case which is covered by Dl .4 -5 , but not by D l . 4 - 1 , is the following: 
the members of P want to economically use the petrol supply which they have at 
their joint disposal; to this purpose, they agree not to drive faster than 100 km/h. 
Here we don't have recurring situations that present their own respective co-
ordination problems. 
Lewis suggested in C various modifications of D l . 4 - 1 : 
1. He demands first of all that a convention in the sense of Dl .4-1 must 
also be known as such in P, that it must be common knowledge among the members 
of P that conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Dl .4-1 obtain. Suppose someone drives 
on the right because he wants to prevent collisions and suppose that he expects 
7 ® may also contain the "empty" action: to do nothing (not to become active). 
everyone else to drive on the right, but without assuming that they also expect 
everyone else to drive on the right, or that they also have an interest in preventing 
collisions, then he would quite falsely assume that they were behaving irrationally 
(C.59). 
But it is not altogether necessary to exclude such cases generally. F>en if the 
members of P don't believe that strategy c is a convention in P (in other words 
don't believe that the others have an interest in conforming to c when they 
themselves do, or don't believe that the others will expect that they themselves 
expect the others to follow c), even then one can still speak of a convention. The 
facts, especially the actions, remain the same; the coordination works. Besides, the 
actions remain significant, inasmuch as everyone expects everyone else to conform 
to c, it will make sense for each agent to conform to c because it is in his interest to 
do so. The only difference is that members of P may possibly (falsely) look upon 
actions of the others as senseless or irrational from the standpoint of the others 
(i.e., from their expectations and interests). 
As a rule, however, the expectations demanded in Dl .4 -1 and Dl .4 -5 
respectively will be based on the assumption that it is common knowledge in P 
that strategy c represents a convention, that, in other words, it makes sense for the 
others to conform to c 8 . Moreover, it is important in the case of some conventions, 
especially conventions of communication, that the actions of the others which are 
in conformity with c are recognised as meaningful. One will then appeal to a 
stricter notion of a convention than the one in D l . 4 - 5 and define: 
Dl.4-6: A strategy c is a convention (in the stricter sense) in P if and only if all 
members of P know that: 
a) c is a common strategy in P 
b) joint action of the members of P which conforms to c solves a particular 
coordination problem in the stricter sense. 
Unless indicated otherwise we will in what follows always understand 
conventions in the stricter sense of Dl .4 -6 . 
The explanation of the concept common knowledge in Lewis (C,II.l) is unclear 
and to make it more precise can then to appeal to an epistemic logic. It can then 
be seen that it is sufficient to demand a common knowledge of the members of P 
in sense of D l . 4 - 6 . 9 
8 We must bear in mind that expectations about the actions of others by no means always 
presuppose that these others are acting on rational considerations. In particular, their actions 
may simply follow habit and explicit considerations may not come into it at all. An 
action by X can make sense, that is, can be useful to X and not have been planned 
rationally by X. 
9 The term "common knowledge" plays a prominent part in Lewis's discussion; 
he introduces it on p. 52 ff. In order to make this particular concept more precise and to 
reconstruct the arguments in which it is used we refer to the system of epistemic logic which 
is put forward in Kutschera (75a), Chapter 4. Let "G(a,p,q)" say something like: "The 
state of affairs q is for an agent reason to believe that p". One defines G(a,p) = D f G(a,p,t), 
where t is a tautology ("a believes that p"). 
Lewis defines the concept "q indicates to a that p" in C,52ff in such a way that it can be 
represented by G(a,p,q). We can then make the following assertion: 
G(a,G(b, A), A) A G(a,B, A) A G(a, Apq(G(a,p,q) = G(b,p,q))) AnG(a,n A p G(a,G(b,B), A), 
which corresponds to Lewis's thesis on p. 53, although in that thesis the antecedent 
-»G(a,nA) doesn't occur. The range of definition of the variables "p" and "q" is restricted to 
states of affairs which are relevant in the context of the conventions, as these are considered 
respectively. Let A and B be corresponding sentences. 
We prove this assertion as follows: 
It is generally the case that (a): G(a,B, A) A G(a, A) 3 G(a,B) and that (b):i()(a,nA)=) 
(G(a,B,A) = G(a,A=>B)). From G(a,B,A) follows G(a,G(a,B,A)). Together with G(a, 
Apq(G(a,p,q) = G(b,p,q))) this yields G(a,G(b,B,A)) (a). From G(a,G(b,A),A) follows 
with iG(a,iA) G(a, A z> G(b,A)) (ß). Following (a) we further have G(a,G(b, A) A G(b,B, A) 
=>G(b,B)), and therefore together with (a) and (ß) G(a, A ZD G(b,B)); nG(a,iA) and (b) 
finally yields G(a,G(b,B),A). 
Lewis then goes on to define on p. 56 the concept "in P it is common knowledge that q" 
by means of the concept "indicate", as follows: 
1) V p A x ( x 6 P 3 G(x,p) A G ( x , A y ( y G P D G(y,p),p) A G(x,q,p)). 
But we have G(x, A) => (G(x,B, A) = G(x,B)). Therefore (1) is equivalent to 
2) Ax(x G P 3 G(x,q) A G(x, Ay(y e P => G(y, q))). 
On the assumption that the members of P believe that they share the same 
inductive standards and the same background information concerning the relevant states of 
affairs (cfr. C,53,56), (1) should according to Lewis yield the higher-order expectations, that 
is, G(a,B) should yield G(a,G(b,B)), G(a,G(b,G(c,B))>, etc. for all agents a,b,c,... in P. 
We can formulate this assumption as follows: 
3) A X ( X € P D G(x,Aypq(yeP3 (G(x,p,q)= G(y,p,q))))). 
On the one hand, it is sufficient to demand instead of (2) and (3) 
2') Ax(xePz>G(x,q)) and 
3') Ax(x€ P ZD G(x, Ayp(y 6 P 3 (G(x,p) = G(y,p)))). 
But on the other hand, one needs an assumption (which Lewis doesn't mention) 
that each member of P knows who belongs to P and who doesn't, that is, 
4) Ax(x G P 3 Ay(y G P = G(x, y G P))). 
From (2') we obtain G(a,q), where aGP. This yields G(a,G(a,q)); together with (3') 
it yields G(a,Ay(yGP3 G(y,q))); together with beP and (4) G(a, G(b,q)). From this in turn 
we obtain G(a,G(a,G(b,q))); together with (3') we obtain from it G(a,Ay(y G P 3 G(y, 
G(b,q)))); together with c G P and (4) G(a,G(c,G(b,q))), etc. 
In other words, we can get by with (2') instead of (2) and with the weaker (3') 
instead of (3). That is, we can express the common belief in P that q simply byAx(xGP3 G(x,q)) 
and the common knowledge in P that q simply by Ax(xGp3 W(x,q)). Here "W(a,p)" means 
"a knows that p". We can define W(a, A) = D f G(a, A) A A. 
2. We also have conventions where not in every single application of f is there 
a coordination problem (C,II.3). 
We have already allowed for this case in Dl .4 -5 and Dl .4 -6 . The definition 
at which Lewis arrives as a result (C,76) again has, compared to our definitions, 
the shortcoming that it will not exclude any action-procedure which has been 
marked out as the one and only rational procedure to follow. 
3. For a convention to exist, it is not necessary that all members of P always 
adhere to strategy c in respect of f; it is sufficient if most of the members do this 
most of the time (C,78). 
If a member of P never or only rarely behaves according to c he doesn't 
participate in the convention and we will then have to restrict P accordingly. 
It will therefore be sufficient to widen D l . 4 - 5 (and D l . 4 - 6 correspondingly) in 
such a way that all members of P keep to the strategy in most cases. 
In what follows we will understand conventions in the sense of this wider 
definition. 1 0 
Finally, it is for many cases appropriate to give the notion of a convention 
a more subjective tone. If an agent X by mistake doesn't follow strategy c in a 
situation S we won't yet speak of a violation of a convention by X . For this 
purpose one can change the notion of a strategy as it was understood in D l . 4 - 2 
in such a way that c is a (subjective) strategy of X in respect of © and 9> if c(S) 
indicates for all § e S for which c(S) is defined the action-procedure he9) which X 
strives to carry out, provided he believes that S exists. If one applies D l . 4 -3 — Dl .4 -6 
1 0 What distinguishes Dl.4-6 from Lewis's definition in C,76 and our extension of 
cDl.4-6 from his definition in C, 78 can be summarized in the following points: 
a) Lewis only assumes a coordination problem in the wider sense instead of a 
coordination problem in the stricter sense. That is, he inadequately also classifies as 
conventional behavioural procedures which have unequivocally been marked out as the best 
procedures to follow. 
b) Lewis demands an approximate concurrence of the preferences in P regarding all 
possible results of the actions of the agents in P, while we demand that all agents in P 
prefer the CE. 
The explicit demands concerning the expectations and preferences of the members of 
P are made by Lewis only in sensu diviso: that is, only from one situation to the next 
situation in which the members of P act. This extension is, however, cancelled out again by 
his demand of "common knowledge": if a believes that he believes in all situations S that p 
holds, this will make sense to a only if a believes that p holds in all situations S. 
Moreover, Lewis doesn't speak of strategies, but of regularities in behaviour which 
consist in doing R in all situations of the kind S in which one participates as an agent. But 
what is thus described is surely a strategy; and all strategies can be so described, if necessary, 
by redefining R and S. Finally, it remains unclear in Lewis whether in a situation S only the 
preferences of those who actually participate as agents in S are considered in conditions (3), 
(4) and (5) of his definition —which would be inadequate since, for example, only one agent 
need be acting in S—or whether the preferences of all members of P are considered. 
to such a notion of a strategy one again obtains a wider notion of a convention. 
Although such distinctions are important we won't consider them in what follows, 
so as not to burden the presentation of the basic ideas with secondary problems. 
/.5. Conventions and norms. 
Let us assume that driving on the right had originally been a pure 
convention. However, afterwards this convention had been codified by a statutory 
norm, backed up in turn by sanctions. Can we then still say that driving on the 
right is a convention? 
Sanctions serve to modifiy the subjective preferences in such a way that what 
is being ordered is actually preferred. If originally we had a coordination problem 
in the stricter sense with at least two coordination equilibriums (driving on the left 
or driving on the right), neither of which had been marked out as the rational one, 
then we now have only a coordination problem in the wider sense, for because of 
the sanctions driving on the right is now clearly preferable. One can, however, 
still speak of a coordination problem because the success of the strategy for the 
individual still depends on the others also keeping to it: if all the others suddenly 
were to drive on the left he would do likewise, sanctions or no sanctions. 
If there is a norm involved one may still be inclined, —as in the case of 
driving on the right—, to speak of a convention; but one will hardly look on, e.g., 
paying taxes as being conventional. At the basis of this too lies a cooperation 
problem: it involves getting together money for communal enterprises by the 
State, and the arrangement concerning the sharing of the taxburden can be seen as 
a compromise. There is, however, no coordination problem: there will be many 
people, who would prefer a situation in which all the others paid their taxes, but 
not they themselves. In that case there will be no coordination equilibriums without 
statutory regulations and sanctions: that is, no stable states. Here norms are 
necessary to stabilise. If they are effective we have a coordination problem in the 
wider sense (the success of my tax-paying depends on most of the others paying 
their tax too), but not a coordination problem in the stricter sense.11 
If in D l . 4 -5 one leaves out the addition "in the stricter sense" one gets a 
notion of a convention which is too wide. If a convention has been codified by a 
norm it seems therefore more adequate to speak of "conventional norms" or 
"regulated conventions". Conventional norms then are norms, not conventions 
in the sense of D l . 4 - 5 . Conventions in our sense are compatible with 
norms for conventional strategy c only if they tell us to behave "according to c or 
according to c'", —where c' is a strategy which solves the same coordination 
problem as c. But something like that would seem to occur only rarely.12 
1 1 Cfr. C, sectioning. 
1 2 From the existence of a convention in P doesn't follow an obligation of the 
members of P to act according to the convention. The convention may,for example, further 
ends that are morally wrong. Cfr. C.III,3. 
2. Signs 
2.1. Conventions of communication. 
Coordination problems arise, for example, in the case of an agent X who 
wants to notify another agent Y of something, wants to inform him that a state of 
affairs p exists. If Y can observe that state of affairs directly it will be sufficient 
for X to draw Y's attention to it. If Y can directly observe a state of affairs q 
which he immediately recognises as a natural sign or symptom that p exists, it will 
be sufficient if X draws Y's attention to q. For all other cases linguistic signs 
serve as a conventional substitute for natural signs. For the sake of simplicity we 
consider first only individual conventional signs or signals, t 
If in a group P the common strategy c exists, on the one hand to perform 
an action f (here: to give a certain signal) only //the state of affairs p exists, and on 
the other hand to assume (to trust) that p, in case a member of P does f, then the 
coordination problem concerning information on p can be solved: the speaker 
wants the listener to know that p; and the listener wants to be informed whether p. 
This success can be achieved with the common strategy c concerning f. Furthermore, 
each agent in P expects all the other agents in P to behave according to this 
strategy. In other words, he expects as listener that the speaker adheres to c, 
that is, he expects that p exists in case the speaker does f. And the speaker expects 
that if he does f the listener will react to that with the assumption that p. Thus c 
is a convention in P in the sense of D l . 4 -5 . The expectation of the individual that 
all members of P adhere to c is based on his assumption that it is commonly known 
in P that c represents a convention. One could not expect the listener to react to 
f with the assumption that p if he didn't, for his part, expect also that the speaker 
will do f only when p is the case. And one couldn't expect the speaker to do f in the 
event of p being the case if he didn't, for his part, expect the listener to react with the 
assumption that p. Conventions of communication are therefore also conventions 
in the stricter sense of Dl .4 -6 . 
We cannot assume, however much we are inclined to do so, that strategy 
c in respect of f consists merely in doing f, only if p . 1 3 Such a strategy doesn't really 
solve the coordination problem. It does not make sense, until the listener too 
reacts with the assumption that p. If this is not part of the strategy the listener may 
still react that way if he knows the speaker-strategy and expects that the speaker 
will behave according to c. But it doesn't make sense for the speaker to behave 
that way if he can't rely on the appropriate reaction of the listener. This approach 
therefore misses the existing problem of coordinating the action of the speaker 
and the reaction of the listener. 
One must include in the communication strategies c the listener's responses 
because problems of understanding are always a matter of coordinating the actions 
1 3 This is, for example, the opinion of Schiffer, in (72) p. 151, who criticises Lewis's 
concept "signal-convention" for this very reason, because in his view conventions of language 
don't always solve coordination problems. 
of speaker and listener ("actions" understood here in a somewhat wider sense). 
That is shown also by commands which, next to assertions, form another basic 
type of communication. 
Here strategy c looks like this: the speaker does f only if he wants the listener 
to perform an action r and the listener reacts to an f-action of the speaker with 
this action r. This basic schema has of course still to be differentiated, like that of 
assertion. In the case of assertion, the speaker is already justified subjectively to do 
f if he believes that p is the case. And the listener is obliged to assume that p only 
if the speaker applies f correctly, in other words, if p is actually the case: he is 
subjectively correct therefore if he assumes that p only //he believes that the speaker 
behaves in accordance with c, that is, doesn't lie and isn't mistaken; if he believes, 
in other words, that the speaker is competent and sincere. In the basic schema of 
commands is to be included that the speaker does f only if he not just wants the 
listener to do r, but also has the authority to demand it from him. To this extent 
therefore the listener is held to do r according to c only if the speaker has the 
authority to command. 
Assertion and command are by no means the only types of communication. 
We don't, however, want to try to analyse here the variety of such types (types of 
speech), but will content ourselves with general schemata for communication 
strategies^ 
One could try to reduce all acts of communication to assertions and to 
understand the listener's reactions r always as an assumption that something is the 
case. On that basis, if the speaker were to command the listener to do r he would 
be asserting to the listener that he wants him to do r. The listener would react to that 
with the assumption that the speaker wants this. The outcome of this assumption 
— together with other conventions or norms saying that certain people (among 
them the listener) should do what certain other people who have the authority to 
give orders (among them the speaker) want them to do—the outcome would be the 
reaction r of the listener or an obligation for him to do r. In this account the 
listener would not violate the linguistic convention if—following a correct 
f-utterance -he doesn't do r; he would merely violate other conventions and 
norms. 
- in that case, however, the communication strategy must presuppose such 
norms and refer to them. Without the presupposition that the listener reacts to f 
with r—on whatever grounds—the strategy in respect of f would not immediately 
make sense to the speaker, and a coordination problem would not be solved 
merely by the speaker doing f. And that presupposition would make the listener's 
reaction again part of the communication strategy. 
A corresponding problem exists for the attempt to reduce all acts of 
communication to commands by reducing the terms of the speaker to the intention 
to induce in the listener reaction r. The strategy concerning f would then comprise 
solely that one does f, only if one wants the listener to do r. This, however, applies 
to assertions only if there are norms demanding from the listener to believe p 
only if p actually is the case. Such norms would then again become presuppositions 
for the listener's reaction to make sense and thereby again part of the communication 
strategy. 
We can now determine a general schema (CC) for communication strategies 
c in respect of an action-procedure f as follows: Strategy c contains two 
components. The speaker-component concerns the conditions under which an action 
of the kind f will be directed by a group of speakers S at a group of listeners L . 1 4 
It has the form of a condition 
SC) Under condition P s(S,L,f) f is directed by S at L only if (or: if and only if) 
M(S,L,f), 
or under a system of such conditions. Here P s(S,L,f) is a conjunction of 
presuppositions which, according to the strategy, regulate for S a performance of f 
vis-a-vis L , 1 5 and M(L,S,f) is a conjunction of conditions (external circumstances 
and internal states of the speaker) which make up the special content of the 
communication.1 6 
The listener-component concerns the conditions under which a certain reaction 
r by L follows actions of the kind f by S which are directed at L . It has the form of a 
condition 
LC) Under condition P L(S,L,f) r is performed by L if (if and only if) an action f 
by S is directed at L , 
or under a system of such conditions. Here P L(S,L,f) is a conjunction of con-
ditions under which a reaction r to f is regulated according to the strategy. 
For the sake of simplicity, we will in what follows always assume that 
strategies SC and L C are defined by two single conditions. 
Examples: 
a) For an SOS-call from ships a flag-signal is established. The SC says: if a ship 
L is within view of ship S (Ps) S will show L the SOS flag only if S is in 
distress (M). L C says: if L is in a position to come to S's rescue (PL) L will 
come to S's rescue (r) if S shows L the SOS flag. 
1 4 When we talk of a group of agents we don't mean a set of agents: firstly, a group 
which consists of only one member is to be identical with this member (while we would 
otherwise have {a} # a) and, secondly, groups can be structured as different members play 
different parts in the group which are relevant for actions by the group. When one invites a 
group of actors to play "Hamlet" one doesn't imply that every actor should do the same 
but one implies that they should do something jointly by playing different parts. 
1 5 This condition P s restricts the range of definition of strategy c. We did allow strategies 
in Dl.4-2 which are not defined for all situations. 
1 6 Compared to the positive conditions for (the performance of) f, the negative 
conditions for (the omission of) f (that is, for the performance of nf) seem to be of small 
importance in connection with strategies of communication, insofar as they don't result from 
conditions of the form "if P s then f if and only if M " . 
b) If S is a policeman S will give L a certain sign (f) if and only if L should stop 
(M). And unter condition P s L will stop (r) if S gives him sign f. 
We can term conditions P s and P L presuppositions of f, the speaker- and listener-
presupposition respectively. If the speaker acts in accordance with strategy c he will 
presuppose first of all in a performance of f that P s is fulfilled. But he will assume 
also that P L holds because otherwise he cannot expect L to react with r, in which 
case f would not make sense to S. And the listener will in a performance of r 
following f assume, not merely that P L is fulfilled, but he will also expect that S 
adheres to c, i.e., that P s holds. Consequently, we can also combine P s and P L in a 
joint presupposition P* = P*(S,L,f) of the two conditions SC and L C . 1 7 
2.2. Purely conventional actions 
We distinguish action-performances from action-procedures (both are usually 
called "actions"): a performance of an action-procedure f is an actual, in dividual act, 
in time and space, by a certain subject and of the form f. In the case of actions of 
communication we speak specifically of utterances.and we distinguish consequently 
between the performance of an utterance and the form of an utterance. We distinguish 
furthermore the actions from their results, that is, the action-performance from the 
concrete result of this performance which will be an instance of the type of result 
that corresponds to the action-procedure. In the case of acts of communication we 
speak of an instance of an expression and the form of an expression. (Where a distinction 
is not necessary one can generally speak of "expressions".) 
Consequently, we obtain for acts of communication the following schema: 
Action Result 
Type utterance-form form of expression 
Instance utterance-performance instance of expression 
A communication strategy c applies to an utterance-form f; it says that 
utterance-performances of f, that is, acts of the form f, will be carried out by the 
speaker only under certain conditions and will be answered by the listener, under 
certain conditions, with certain reactions of the form r. One can express the same 
thing also by saying there exists a strategy for the expression-type f* (as a result of f), 
which says that only under certain conditions will this expression be employed by 
the speaker and answered by the listener with certain reactions. In this sense 
communication strategies can also be understood as strategies for the use of 
expressions (as types), —and as strategies for reacting to them; the latter is usually 
not taken into consideration. 
Instead of acts of communication we also speak of signal-actions and we also 
say "sign" instead of "expression". 
1 7 Our concept "convention of communication" is analogous to Lewis's concept 
"signaling convention" (C, 135). 
In order for a conventional sign to be intelligible, it must be guaranteed 
that it is employed only in accordance with the convention. If the signal-action f 
also makes sense independently of the convention then it isn't unequivocally evident 
to the listener, —in a situation which pertains to the convention—, whether the 
speaker adheres to the convention, or perhaps — in violation of this convention— 
does f for another purpose. The listener may indeed expect the speaker to adhere to 
the convention, but this isn't completely unequivocal. The listener cannot, for 
example, always recognise clearly whether the speaker believes that presupposition 
P* is fulfilled or not. It can also happen that S believes that by doing f he can 
pursue the other (natural) end—and still be in accordance with the convention — 
because he falsely assumes that P* is not fulfilled. If this mistake on the part of S is 
not evident to L he (L) will be misled by action f by S. Consequently, for signal-
actions purely conventional acts will be preferred, that is, acts which only make sense 
because of the convention which exists for them. (It can still make sense to drive on 
the right without the convention in question, for example, if one wants to avoid 
the bad surface on the left. On the other hand, it would not make any sense to 
say "Good morning" if there wasn't a convention to that effect.) This is shown 
also by the fact that turning an action—which already serves other ends—into a 
convention for purposes of communication, could result in a conflict if that same 
action serves two ends, of which only one is intended. 
We want to assume therefore in what follows that the acts of communication 
we consider are purely conventional, so that they are meaningless in those cases 
where the presupposition P* is not fulfilled. 
2.3. Meaning 
In the introduction it was said that Lewis's notion of a convention was a 
fruitful starting-point for the development of a satisfactory theory of meaning. 
We can now further illustrate this claim in the case of single signal-actions and 
signs. 
Let us start with signal-actions. There is a general notion of understanding 
and meaning in the case of actions, which is not restricted to linguistic actions: 
we say that we understand an action f by an agent X in its relevance for X if we know 
the intention, the end which X pursues by it, and if we see that given that end it 
makes sense under the existing circumstances. To formulate it somewhat more 
generally: we understand f if we recognise that f makes sense on the criterion of 
maximum utility (cf. 1.3), given X's preferences and expectations. The meaning 
of an action f by X for X himself is the role which f plays for X in the realization 
of his intentions—in other words, we know the meaning of f if we understand f. 
In addition, f can also play a role for agents other than X who are part of the 
action-situation. For them the meaning of f will consist in the role which f plays and 
the relevance which f has for their own actions and their own objectives. We 
therefore understand action f in its relevance for an agent Y if we know the 
meaning of f for Y . 
If we apply these general notions to acts of communication we can say: 
listener L understands a performance f of utterance-form f by speaker S if he 
understands, firstly, the relevance of f for S and, secondly, the relevance of f for 
himself. Since, on our supposition, f is a purely conventional act, f is intelligible 
only because of knowledge of the convention for f. We presuppose that S and L are 
members of language-community P in which a strategy c for f is a convention in 
the sense of Dl .4 -6 . Then L will know c and assume that S adheres to c and does f 
in order to solve a coordination problem. If S does adhere to c presupposition P* 
must be fulfilled in situation T in question, as well as condition M . L knows therefore 
that S assumes in T that M obtains and, given this condition, has an interest in L 
doing r and he knows that S believes that L — i n the case of P* and M obtaining— 
also has an interest in doing r. As a result L recognises that action f by S in T 
makes sense for S, that is, he understands the relevance of f' for S and the meaning of 
f for S. And he understands the intention on which S acts in f, viz., to bring about 
reaction r in L . 
L understands, secondly, the relevance of f for himself: L has—given con-
ditions P* and M—an interest in doing r because it results for him in a relatively 
optimum result (in the sense of a coordination equilibrium). Action f by S will 
indicate to L that M obtains, i.e., that it is appropriate for him to do r. Hence he 
understands the relevance of f' for himself, too. 
If we had determined conventions of communication only in the sense of 
D l . 4 -5 the outcome might have been that acts of communication would be 
unintelligible. If L doesn't know that strategy c for f is a convention in the sense of 
D l . 4 -5 (so that c is not a convention in the sense of Dl .4-6) , he will still expect 
that M obtains if S does f, because he expects S to behave according to c; but he 
may assume that S doesn't expect, while doing f, that he (L) will react to it with r, 
or assume that it isn't in S's interest. But then L will not be able to understand f 
as an action which —from S's viewpoint—makes sense. 
The meaning of f results from the convention for the action-procedure f. 
Consequently, we can also speak of the meaning of f which is established by 
convention c for f. A performance f of f can acquire, within the concrete 
situation, an excess-meaning which not all the other performances of f have. Thus 
the assertion "it rains" can—by virtue of the concrete situation—also function as 
a recommendation ("take your umbrella with you") or as a command ("shut the 
window, to stop it raining in"). This meaning, this role of a speech-act is the result 
of its meaning as established by the general convention for f, and of the special 
circumstances of the utterance-performance. It is therefore mediated through 
language, but not fixed purely in language. For the sake of simplicity, we will leave 
this excess-meaning out of this account in which we are only concerned with the 
fundamental aspects of the matter. 
Finally, we can also speak of the meaning of the sign f* as expression-
form, that is, as type of result of utterance-form f, since f* and f clearly 
correspond to each other. 
It is crucial in these initial stages of the theory of meaning that, —as opposed 
to the realistic theories of semantics—, we do not primarily assign some kind of 
entities (things, properties, propositions etc.) as references to expression-forms 
(as the linguistic objects); but rather that we understand that utterance-forms (as 
linguistic action-procedures) acquire—through conventions of communication— 
a meaning in a general sense, as role or function of these action-procedures. The 
theory of meaning-as-use is based on the idea that objects, called expressions, are 
assigned a meaning, through rules for their employment. This idea indeed 
approaches the thesis discussed here, since reference is made to rules for acts of 
speech, but because of its one-sided orientation on the speaker-component of the 
convention, it remains unintelligible just how rules for the use of expressions can 
effect a coordination of action, in contrast to, for example, the rules for moving 
chess-pieces. That, in conventions of language, listener's reactions must be included 
too, has been stressed at first by the speech-act-theory. But there too the structure 
of the conventions and thereby the accomplishment of the speech-acts, remains 
obscure. It is Lewis's chief merit, in his analysis of the conventions of communication, 
to have laid the basis for a satisfactory understanding of the function and the 
accomplishment of speech-acts, and thereby of their meaning. 
We speak of "meaning" in a general sense also, when applied to states of 
affairs, not only actions. We say, for example, that a state of affairs p is an 
indication for another state of affairs q, or that p means q, if one can infer that q is the 
case from p being the case, or if p renders q at least probable. Falling atmospheric 
pressure is, for example, a sign for a deterioration of the weather, or diffuse red 
spots on the skin a symptom of scarlet-fever. Next to such natural signs p for states 
of affairs q for which "if p then q" holds by virtue of correlations governed by laws 
of nature, we have conventional signs for which this correlation holds by virtue of 
conventions. They are artificial indications that have the advantage that we can 
produce them freely, that we can characterize them unequivocally as signs for certain 
states of affairs, and that by means of them we can in form the listener of states of 
affairs to which he otherwise has little or no access at all (like past events or our 
intentions, wishes and convictions). The borderline between artificial and natural 
signs is in all this not a sharp one, since, for example, gestures that have the 
character of a natural sign can be turned into conventions too. 
This talk of sign and meaning can also be directly applied to language: if 
a strategy c for f is a convention in P then the fact that a speaker S performs f in a 
situation T is an indication for listener L that M holds and that S wants L to do r. 
For if S and L belong to a language-community, S will adhere to c, that is, he will 
perform f only if M holds and if he has an interest in L doing r. That S does f means 
for L , in this sense of "meaning", that M holds and that S wants L to do r. 
One usually distinguishes between the meaning of an utterance and its 
presupposition. The presupposition must necessarily be fulfilled, or the utterance will 
not make sense; while the meaning will give the specific sense of the utterance. 
According to this distinction P* indicates the presupposition of an act of communi-
cation f: only if P* obtains in a situation <3 is the performance of f regulated by 
the convention. And since f is a purely conventional act f will be a significant 
action in this case only. The meaning of f will then be specified by M and r only: 
if M holds then S and L have an interest in L doing r, and this will be effected by S's 
utterance of f. 
H . P. Grice suggested in (57) to define the notion of conventional meaning, 
and generally the case of "nonnatural" signification (as opposed to "natural", 
symptomatic signification), as follows: 
D l : S meansnn r by f in situation T = D f S intends by f in T to induce in L 
response r by making L recognise this intention. 
D2: f meansnn r = D f for all (most) speakers S and situations T : if S does f in T S 
meansnn r with f in T. 
For what S means with a speech-act f is the intention which S pursues 
with f. This intention is to induce in listener L a reaction r. Since f is not a 
natural cause of r this only succeeds through the convention for f. If L knows this 
convention he understands f as a request to do r, and will do r if he adheres to the 
convention. By virtue of his knowledge of the convention L recognises, therefore, 
that S wants him (L) to do r. That will induce him to do r since a coordination 
problem exists which will be solved by the joint strategy for f. So if S meansnn r 
by f in T, where r is an action by L , then S intends with f in T to induce in L 
reaction r. And because he knows that L does r given f only if he knows the 
convention, i.e., S's intention, one can say: S attempts to bring about r by making 
L recognise this intention. 
The reverse, though, does not hold, as Searle, Lewis and Strawson have 
shown: 1 8 
1. The intentions which one pursues as speaker with f often go beyond the 
immediate reaction r of the listener, beyond that, in other words, which belongs to 
the conventional meaning of f. For example, one informs L that q is the case, with 
the intention that L will react, first with the assumption that q, but consequently 
—given the circumstances—will do i. t does not belong to the conventional 
meaning since, with the same r, t may vary completely from case to case. Grice, 
for this very reason, distinguished between primary and secondary responses and 
demands that only the primary responses (in our case r, but not r) should be 
considered in D l . However, this distinction is not clear and must also refer to the 
content of the convention for f, for the characterization of which D l was supposed 
to be a substitute in the first place. 
Cfr. C,157ff, Searle (69), 2.6, and Strawson (64). 
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2. If S is mistaken regarding the convention for f then his intentions don't 
correspond to the convention and one cannot say then that f (on the strength of the 
convention) means the response which S intended. 
3. Most of all: not just the conventional meaning is grasped in D l (that wasn't 
Grice's intention either). Strawson gives an example of an act f which satisfies the 
definiens in D l , but in which we cannot possibly talk of a conventional meaning 
of f: "S . . . arranges convincing-looking "evidence" that p, in a place, where L is 
bound to see it. He does this, knowing that L is watching him at work, but 
knowing also that L does not know that S knows that L is watching him at work. 
He realizes that L will not take the arranged "evidence" as genuine or natural 
evidence that p, but realizes, and indeed intends, that L will take his arranging of it 
as grounds for thinking that he, S, intends to induce in L the belief that p . . . He 
knows that L has general grounds for thinking that S would not wish to make him, 
L , think that p unless it were known to S to be the case that p; and hence that L's 
recognition of his (S's) intention to induce in L the belief that p will in fact seem 
to L a sufficient reason for believing that p. And he intends that L's recognition of 
his intention . . . should function in just this way" (Strawson (64), 446,f). 
Searle has pointed out that in a definition of linguistic meaning one must 
refer to conventions: speaker S must act in accordance with a convention for f in 
order to mean something conventionally by f, i.e., mean that which one con-
ventionally means by f, or in other words: that which f means. As Lewis has shown 
(C, 155) and as we have seen above, reference to conventions makes reference to 
intentions superfluous. For from the fact that S employs f in accordance with 
convention c it follows that by doing f he wants to induce in listener L reaction r 
(by making him recognise this intention). 
Lewis's thesis already contains then the idea, on which Grice's definition is 
based, that speech-acts are set apart from other actions by the fact that they already 
reach their objective by this and only this: that the others recognise that very 
objective. It is more precise, though, than Grice's notion which is too wide (for 
linguistic meaning), and it is more natural since he derives the notion of linguistic 
meaning from the general notion of meaning by reference to conventions of 
communication which establish the role and function of speech-acts. 
3. Languages 
3.1, A model of logical grammar. 
A language is not a system of signals, i.e., a set of signs for which individual 
conventions of communication are established. The grammar with which we 
describe a language is a system of rules which by no means all characterize 
communication strategies. There are syntactical rules for the construction of well-
formed expressions: and semantical rules don't only relate to expressions and sequen-
ces of expressions (sentences or texts) which can be employed for communication, but 
relate also to single words; and as regards sentences and texts, the conventions 
for them are based on the semantical rules for the parts of speech of which they 
consist. 
In this section we want to illustrate the construction of a grammar by 
taking as example the logical grammar of a simple language L from predicate logic 
which has indexicals and performative operators. In the next section we will then 
discuss the relationship between the semantical rules and the conventions of 
communication. The construction of this grammar is carried out in three steps, in 
the first two of which we will construct a grammar for the sentence-radicals in a way 
which is customary in logic. 
3.1.1. The syntax of L 
The alphabet of L will contain, besides punctuation marks (parentheses, 
comma) and logical symbols (-,, A ,A ) , object-constants and object-variables (OC 
and OV), p redicate-constants (PC) (each of a particular place-number) and the performa-
tive operators 93, 5 and OC's are especially the indexicals s (I), h (you), d (this). 
The sentence-radicals (SR) of L are determined like this: 
a) If F is an n-place PC and a l y . . . ,a n are OC's then F ( a x , . . .,an) is an SR 
b) If A is an SR then n A is an SR 
c) If A and B are SR's then (A A B) is an SR 
d) If A[a] is an SR and x is an O V which doesn't occur in A[a] then 
AxA[x] is an SR too. 
The sentences of L are determined like this: 
If A is an SR and P a performative operator then P(A) is a sentence. 
3.1.2. Semantics of the SRs 
Let U be a non-empty set of objects and I a non-empty set of possible 
worlds with the objects of U . I is to be the set of all triples j = <0t,ß,y>, where oc 
and ß are agents from U and y is an object from U . Let = a, (j)2 = ß, (j)3 = y. 
A n interpretation of the SR's over U , I and J is a function (p such that for all 
iGI and jG J : 
a) (pij(a)GU and 
b) 9i,j( a) = 9r,j'( a) f ° r all OC's except s,h,d. 
c) q>i.jOO = (J)i> <Pi,j(h) = (j)2, <Pi,j(d) = (j)3-
d) (p i ) j(F)c=U n (where U n is the set of n-tuples of objects from U) and 
e) <Pi,j(F) = f ° r all n-place PC's 
0 <Pi,j(F(ai, • • -,an)) - w if and only if ((pLj(ai)> • . . ,9uW)e<Pi,j(F) 
g) (pi j(nA) = w if and only if (Pij(A) = f 
h) (py(AAB) = w if and only if cpifj(A) = cpipj(B) = w 
i) cpi? j(AxA[x]) = w if and only if Acp'((p' f (p 3 cpJ^Afb]) = w). 
Here (p' f= (p says that interpretations (p and cp' agree to at most the values 
cp* j(b) and (Pij(b) for any number of index-pairs <i,j>. 
If we have je J and if A is an SR we will call the pair <A,j> an utterance-
radical (UR). If A is a sentence we will call <A,j> an utterance, j specifies speaker, 
listener and object spoken about of a UR or an utterance, as the case may be. 
<A,j> is therefore (where A is a sentence) an utterance by addressed to (j)2. 
And, in case d occurs in A , <A,j> is an utterance about (j)3. 
Hence an interpretation of the SR's over U , I and J is a correlation of 
states of affairs to SR's and UR's in L : Xiip{j(A) is the state of affairs which is 
expressed by UR <A , j) (where X is the symbol for abstraction), A,ij(pjj(A) is the 
state of affairs which is expressed by SR A . 
3. Communication strategies for sentences. 
(1) and (2) establish the usual notion of an interpretation for logical 
languages. By themselves, however, these correlations of objects and states of affairs 
to expressions in L don't yet define communication strategies. We will have to 
establish these strategies seperately if we want an interpretation of the sentences. 
In our exposition communication strategies appear as interpretations of the per-
formative operators, so that the meaning of a sentence P(A) depends on the state of 
affairs which is correlated to its SR (in the sense of the usual logical semantics) 
and on its performative mood which is established by P. 
We interpret the operators 33, $ and as indicative, imperative and 
interrogative moods (the interrogative mood of interrogative sentences). 
33)SC:An utterance <93(A),j> will be made in i only if<p i% j(A) = w (i.e., if the state 
of affairs which is expressed by ( A , j ) exists in i). 
L C : T o an utterance (93(A),j> in i (j)2 reacts with the assumption that 
(Pi.j(A) = w. 
(5)SC: An utterance <$(A),j> will be made in i only if (j)i wants (j)2 to realize 
the proposition Ai<p L i(A) and is in a position of authority over (j)2. 
L C : If (j)i has the authority in i to command (j)2, (j)2 reacts to <$r(A), j> by realizing 
the proposition ^19 { -}(A). 
9)) SC: An utterance <£)(A),j) will be made in i only if (j)i in i wants to know from 
(j)2 whether (pij(A) = w (i.e., whether the state of affairs Xi<pKj(A) obtains 
ini). 
L C : To an utterance <§(A), j> in i (j)2 reacts with utterance (93(a),j'> or 
<23(-iA),j'>, as the case may be, (where }' = <(j)2>(j)i,(j)3», depending on 
whether <p{ -(A) = w or = f. 
These formulations must be understood as only roughly approximate 
characterizations of assertion, command and question. Because, first of all, there 
are several types of these performative moods between which one would have to 
make distinctions, and, moreover, one would have to specify presuppositions, like 
for example in (g), that the state of affairs which the listener should bring about 
doesn't already exist, that he is capable of bringing it about etc. However, our aim 
here is not a fully adequate characterization, but only an illustration of the schema 
according to which a grammar can be constructed. 
Lewis's description (in C, V.4) of the convention for the use of a language L 
means that the whole of language is constructed and interpreted by him in the sense 
of an SR-language, including the performative operators which are interpreted in 
analogy to the schema "true"-"false" for indicative sentences. In his description 
the communication strategy applies to language as a whole (to the system of all its 
rules) and says only that all members of language-community P strive to be truthful 
in L (C, 192); i.e., they try to utter an assertion only if it is true, to obey an 
imperative if one is obliged to, etc. 
In our exposition there exists in P likewise an effective joint strategy of 
truthfulness in L in this sense. However, we give separate conventions of 
communication for the use of the performative operators; the framework of these 
conventions is then for the rest as in Lewis's exposition. But Lewis is forced, as a 
result of his interpretation, to specify "truthful use of an utterance" separately for 
each different performative mood (C, 192). 
Although playing chess consists in moving pieces, not all rules of chess are 
rules for moving chess-pieces. One cannot, therefore, define the game of chess as 
a system of rules for moving pieces. On the other hand, one will not say that there is 
only one rule of chess, viz., to play chess correctly. For an explanation of what is 
"correct" presupposes that the individual rules are given according to which the 
players will have to proceed. Similarly, it is impossible in the case of languages to 
give communication strategies for all well-formed expressions, for one cannot 
communicate with words like "picture", "Hans", "and" etc. Hence there are no 
speech-acts like referring, predicating etc. (which Searle introduces in (69)); 
communication strategies start only with sentences. But one will then have to define 
such strategies for sentences, and that means: one will have to interpret the per-
formative operators by means of such strategies and not through correlation. For, 
first of all, one cannot possibly succeed in determining the truthful use uniformly 
for all types of sentences; and, secondly, one should make visible as far as possible 
the micro-structure of communication, just as in chess one will formulate as many 
rules as possible as rules for moving pieces which regulate the procedure directly. 
3.2. Descriptive and performative meaning. 
According to this model of logical grammar it now looks as if the 
descriptive meaning of the constants and sentence-radicals which was given above in 
a realistic manner by correlations of objects, properties and propositions to 
linguistic expressions, has primacy over the meanings of sentences which result from 
the conventions of communication (93), (5) a n d (£>)• F ° r the meaning of an 
utterance <93(A),j>, for example, results—following (93)—from the descriptive 
meaning A,iq)itj(A) of the SR A . In that case, however, the superiority of the 
theory of meaning which results from Lewis's exposition and which we had 
praised earlier would be fictitious, as this theory would have a purely realistic 
foundation. 
That this is not the case, but that on the contrary the performative meanings 
of sentences as they are established by conventions of communication can be seen 
as the basis of semantics is shown by the following reconstruction: 
As a first step the reference of the OC's in utterances of sentences of the form 
93(F(a)) is determined. The correlation of objects to OC's in such utterances is 
unproblematic; problematic are only the correlations of abstract entities like 
properties or propositions which—on a non-realistic view—only result by abstrac-
tion from meaningful predicates or sentences.19 The OC " d " serves as a linguistic 
reinforcement of pointing gestures. The reference for the other indexicals "s" 
("I") and " h " ("you") of L can likewise be determined. OC's are introduced, first 
of all, as a substitute for indexicals when their reference is pointed at ("Fritz" 
with pointing gesture, or "this is Fritz"), a substitute which recommends itself by 
being independent of the situation. 
With this the values (pjj(a) for O Ca are fixed. 
As a second step conventions of communication for elementary sentences of 
the form 93(F(ax,. . . ,an)) are introduced. In the case of a one-place PC F, a 
corresponding strategy looks, for example, like this: 
I) SC: If a situation i of the kind I presents itself and if cpij(a) is an object from a 
set U then an utterance <(53(F(a)), j) in i will be made only if the object 
Cpij(a) which is signified by "a" has the property f. 
L C : If a situation i of the kind I presents itself and if cpjj(a) is an object from the 
set U then listener (j)2 will react to an utterance <93(F(a)),j> in i with the 
assumption that (pjj(a) has property f. 
By convention (I) a set of circumstances, situations or, as we have said above, 
worlds, is marked out in which an utterance <33(F(a)),j> is significant. For the sake 
of simplicity, we have assumed that I is the same set for all utterances in L . In 
addition, (I) marks out a set of objects, viz., those objects to which —according 
to (I) — the predicate F can be significantly assigned. Here too we assume for the 
sake of simplicity that this set U is constant for all such conventions. 2 0 
We can now define: 
An utterance <93(F(a)),j> is true in i if it can be made in conformity with (I) (i.e., if 
it wouldn't represent a violation of (I)); it is false if it cannot be made in conformity 
with (I). 
We can then determine the value (pjj(F) as the set of objects a e U for 
which <95(F(d)),j> is true in i , where (j)3 = d. If we further stipulate: (p iJ(F(a)) = w 
Cfr. e.g. Kamlah and Lorenzen (67), IV, par. 2. 
If one assumes different sets I and U one must introduce partial interpretations of L. 
Cfr. e.g. Kutschera (75). 
if and only if (pi, j(a)6(p i i j(F) then (piJ(F(a)) = w if and only if <23(F(a)),j> is 
true in i . 
There is a corresponding procedure for many-placed PC's. 
In this way we are able—first of all for OC's, PC's and elementary 
SR's — to provide a basis to the correlations by means of the function (p, by 
reference to conventions of communication. One will not be able to say then that 
through convention (I) we still correlate a property f to the PC F in a realistic 
fashion. One will rather have to distinguish between the convention itself as a strategy 
for behaving in P and its description in a meta-language. An agent X who wants to 
learn language L can learn it from meta-language descriptions of its conventions 
like, for example, (I). However, if X learns L from the usage by other agents, for 
example Y , then X acquires the disposition to apply predicate F correctly in 
assertions of the form 93(F(a)) without first being dependent on a description of the 
convention in question. 
The problem of learning conventions of language is at first the same 
as that which presents itself for the learning of conventions in general: X 
presupposes that there is a common interest in coordinating actions of a certain 
type, that there is a coordination problem and that this is also known to Y . X also 
presupposes that Y will act in such a way that, given a correct reaction by X , 
success will result. This success can be ascertained by X . He will therefore try to 
react in such a way that—together with Y's actions—a joint success is the 
result. 
In the case of conventions of language (of communication) this means: 
X learns first of all the role of listener, the correct reaction r to speech-acts f by Y 
as speaker, that is, he learns the listener-component L C of the convention in schema 
CC as he observes S's reactions to his own reactions to f (success if Y accepts it as 
the correct reaction, failure if he rejects it as wrong). The speaker-component is 
learned by X as he observes under which conditions Y does f and as he lets 
himself be corrected by Y in his own applications of f. If—upon f-acts by X — 
Y shows reaction r (which X has already got to know as correct), this will 
confirm that X used f correctly. If X has learned in this way the strategy for f he 
will know the convention for f and thereby understand f-utterances. 
According to Lewis, conventions are certainly not just explicit, that is, 
linguistically fixed ways of behaviour; and that is why neither the existence of 
conventions nor our learning them presuppose that they can be described in 
language. But one has to resort to linguistic descriptions if one wants to speak about 
conventions — as we do—or wants to comprehend them in a grammar in the form 
of explicit rules. Our description of strategy-schema (I) which included talk of 
properties does to that extent not imply that strategies of behaviour according to 
this schema presuppose the existence of such properties or refer to them. Thus (I) 
describes only a regularity of behaviour or a competence that can be learnt, and the 
same goes for the function (p: its introduction is nothing more than just an 
expedient to describe conventions of language. 
For the third step in the reconstruction of (p we proceed from conventions in 
virtue of which an utterance <23(-iA),j> in i is true if and only if the utterance 
<93(A),j> in i is false, and an utterance <©(A AB ) , J> in i is false if and only if both 
the utterances <23(A),j> and <93(B),j> are true in i . If one defines the function (p 
for such sentences such that (Pij^A) = w if and only if (p i i j(A) = f and 
(p i i j (AAB) = w if and only if Cpij(A) = (pLj(B) = w, then one obtains generally 
that cpij(A) = w if and only if the utterance <®(A),j> in i is true. 
This principle can be extended to apply to universally quantified sentences: 
there is a convention according to which an utterance <JB(AxA[x]), j> in i is true 
if and only if utterances of the kind 33(A[d]) of the same speaker, addressed to the 
same listener, but with all possible references to objects in U , are true (i.e., if the 
utterances <53(A[d]),j'> are true for all j', where (j')i = (j)i and (j')2 = (j^)-2 1 
Consequently, one stipulates that (pj j(AxA[x]) = w if and only if cp{ j(A[d]) = w 
for all ) of the kind given. 
The descriptive semantics for all SR's in L can be introduced in this way, 
based on conventions for predicates in indicative contexts and on logical conventions 
which indicate the conditions for asserting logically complex sentences in terms of 
conditions for asserting constituent sentences. 
The construction of the descriptive semantics of the SR's serves to determine 
these SR's semantically in such a way that one can give the conventions for 
other types of speech, for commands, questions etc., in the simple form in which 
it was done in 3.1. If the constants, logical operators and SR's are defined 
semantically by conventions in the case of indicative speech then all that is needed is 
an interpretation of the (other) performative operators and we will be able to assign 
meanings to all sentences. 
These reflections show, in the example of a simple case, how one can get 
systematically from conventions of communication to intensional semantics, 
and they show that the latter is merely an expedient for the description of 
conventions of language. 
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